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Interview on Chang-fa Lo’s draft Convention on Cross-Border Enforcement of International 
Mediated Settlement Agreements. 
 
Interview with The Honourable Justice Chang-fa Lo,  
Justice, Constitutional Court, Taiwan; Professor, National Taiwan University 
College of Law 
and  
Dr. Winnie Jo-Mei Ma, Honorary Assistant Professor, Bond University Faculty of 
Law, Australia 
 
 
Editor Nadja Alexander interviews Professor Lo and Dr. Winnie Jo-Mei Ma about their draft 
Convention on Cross-Border Enforcement of International Mediated Settlement Agreements. 
 
 
Alexander: What prompted you to put forward this draft “Convention on Cross-Border 
Enforcement of International Mediated Settlement Agreements”?  The task of drafting such legal 
instruments is usually done by international bodies such as UNCITRAL, isn’t it?   
 
Lo: You are absolutely correct in that legal instruments of such kind are usually drafted by 
international bodies. But the idea of drafting a convention by scholars or private parties is not 
our creation. For instance, in the past there were some Harvard draft conventions on various subject 
matters being published for discussions and consideration.  
 
Actually, when Winnie and I first discussed this issue, we did not have an absolute preconception in 
mind that we would draft a set of convention articles. It was at later stage in our deliberation when 
we came to believe that a hard law (such as a convention to be mandatorily implemented by 
participating countries) should be preferred over a soft law (such as a set of guidelines or principles 
to be voluntarily considered by countries when formulating their laws and policies), as it would be 
more appropriate for the purpose of having a real impact on States’ practice in recognizing 
and enforcing international mediated settlement agreements (iMSAs).  
 
We see our activities as facilitating and contributing to the codification process, which needs inputs 
from different participants. We believe that private participation in the codification of a set of 
norms should be of high importance, especially when there are immense public interests involved. 
For the issues of cross-border enforcement of iMSAs, we believe that the involvement of 
public interests is high. It concerns effective, swift and possibly less-costly settlement of disputes. It 
is also about the maintenance of trust and good faith in international transactions and a 
sound environment for cross-border business activities.  
 
As for the specific idea of drafting a convention for the cross-border enforcement of iMSAs, this was 
raised several years ago at a conference held in Taipei at which Professor Laurence Boulle, Winnie 
and I were among the speakers. We thought that the issue was intellectually interesting, as well as 
theoretically and practically important. We kept this in mind and discussed among ourselves how 
to make it happen. Throughout the whole period, we became more and more certain that there 
should be a genuine mechanism for the cross-border enforcement of iMSAs, instead of resorting to 
an arbitration proceeding to include the contents of an iMSA merely for the technical purpose of 
enforcement. So we decided to draft a convention specifically for the enforcement of iMSAs. 
 
Ma: This international collaboration (known as the “MSA Project”) began in 2012 by exploring 
diverse legal and policy issues of whether and how to have an international instrument for 
enforcing MSAs. The project’s ultimate ambition was to produce guidelines for drafting an 
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international instrument to harmonise the current regimes for enforcing MSAs. After 
two conferences and a colloquium (with additional participants including Lawrence Boo from 
Singapore and Bobette Wolski from Australia), drafting the actual international instrument was a 
natural (albeit more ambitious) progression. Professor Lo and I challenged ourselves, 
and relished presenting our perspectives free from political, institutional or practical constraints. 
 
Alexander: In 2015 it seems that UNCITRAL will take up the task of developing a multilateral 
convention on the enforceability of international commercial mediated settlement agreements 
with the goal of encouraging cross-border mediation. Are you hopeful that they will use your 
draft Convention? 
 
Lo: Actually, we did not set a very ambitious goal for our activities in the beginning. When we 
first considered this issue, there had not been obvious international efforts on this matter. So our 
initial goals were to raise the awareness of the issue and to promote the idea of cross-border 
enforcement of iMSAs, through publishing and widely circulating our draft. Now since there is an 
apparent trend of seriously considering having a convention of this kind by the 
international community, we certainly hope that our draft will contribute to the ultimate adoption 
of such convention.  
 
It will be absolutely great if the representatives at UNCITRAL would pay attention to the 
issues considered and the approaches adopted in our draft.   
 
Ma: I have been hoping and waiting for UNCITRAL to consider (or reconsider) reforming 
its current model law provision or developing a convention on MSA enforcement. Hopefully our 
draft Convention will provide a concrete starting point or benchmark for testing the key issues 
and concerns. We welcome feedback from everyone to assist with refining this draft Convention. 
 
Alexander: Some commentators have suggested caution in relation to the introduction of a 
Convention such as the one you have drafted. They raise a concern about the growing policy and 
academic discourse that, using international arbitration as a precedent, assumes the need for an 
international convention to establish a recognition and expedited enforcement scheme for cross-
border MSAs without considering other existing and potential mechanisms first. Here the fear is 
that, in the race towards a largely pre-determined “solution,” we may overlook and under-utilise 
resources such as existing infrastructure, or relevant enforcement mechanisms in existing cross-
border legal instruments. 
 
Lo: You raise a very important point about the possible under-utilisation of current infrastructure. 
But I would not have serious concern about this. Our purpose is not to create a competing 
mechanism so as to dissuade people from using the well-established arbitration or national court 
systems. The goal is merely to fine-tune a deficient aspect of the current mediation mechanism. I 
am very optimistic that arbitration will still be heavily relied upon by businesses even when 
a convention of such kind is in place. Many strengths in arbitration are not replaceable by 
mediation. But when businesses are able to settle their disputes in an amicable way, they should be 
provided with a simple and straightforward means to ensure that the results of their discussions 
are faithfully performed. I firmly believe that different dispute settlement mechanisms are mutually 
supportive in their functions in resolving or preventing disputes. The convention will assist the 
proper functions of mediation, which, together with arbitration and national court systems, will 
help businesses to structure or maintain healthier relations with their counterparts. 
 
Ma: There is indeed caution and even resistance against premature drafting of such a convention 
without comprehensive empirical or cross-disciplinary studies. Yet the drafting process itself 
actually facilitates the exploration and even resolution of the key issues and concerns.  
 
The MSA Project has confirmed that the current enforcement mechanisms remain problematic, 
regardless of whether they are overlooked or under-utilised. For instance, cumbersome and even 
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artificial hybrid processes risk compromising the quality and even integrity of mediation 
and arbitration. Our draft Convention intends to supplement and complement existing 
and potential mechanisms (see Article 7). Improving the enforceability of MSAs will strengthen the 
utility of mediation, which will become more and more important in this generation 
of coalescing crises and conflicts. 
 
Alexander: Now, let’s get to the Convention itself. How would you define the aim of your draft 
Convention? 
 
Lo: The draft Convention aims to tackle the practical needs of iMSAs being enforced across the 
border. First, it enhances the positive aspects of mediation. We believe that mediation is more cost-
effective than most other dispute resolution mechanisms. It is more capable of preserving amicable 
relationships between the disputing parties. The fact that more parties are incorporating various 
forms of mediation clauses in their contracts reflects its growing importance to commercial 
matters. The draft Convention recognizes the advantages of mediation and facilitates the use of 
mediation in international commercial matters by creating a mechanism to allow the possible 
enforcement of  iMSAs. Second, it reduces the negative  aspects  arising from the fact  that iMSAs 
are not universally recognized as enforceable. Without a proper enforcement mechanism, 
mediating parties too often resort to an arbitration format purely to incorporate the 
mediated result into an arbitral award for enforcement purposes. This shows the need for a 
mechanism to enforce mediated settlement agreements of international nature. Furthermore, a 
mediated settlement agreement is the result of a dispute settlement proceeding, whereas an 
ordinary settlement agreement is the result of the parties creating rights and obligations by 
themselves. It is undesirable for parties to an iMSA to resort to another full set of dispute settlement 
procedures such as litigation or arbitration to resolve disputes arising from non-performance of an 
iMSA. The draft Convention helps to avoid unnecessary costs and technicalities of including 
the contents of mediated settlement agreements in arbitral awards, as well as the undesirable 
additional sets of dispute settlement procedures to resolve disputes which have already been 
settled through successful mediation. 
 
Ma: Participants at the MSA Colloquium at Bond Law Faculty in November 2013 
debated on collapsing the distinction between mediated and ordinary negotiated settlements, 
specifically the question of why MSAs might be treated differently from other settlement 
agreements. Some emphasised party self-determination as mediation’s distinguishing feature, 
which can be ensured by mediators’ reality testing and thereby ensuring a quality outcome. Others 
feared that the extension to other settlement agreements may open a floodgate. Regardless of our 
views on whether we should promote mediation over other ADR processes, mediation is already 
treated and regulated differently. And there is potential for improving the current regulation, 
specifically the enforceability issue. 
 
Alexander: Professor Lo, your response seems to suggest a view that corresponds with 
conventional wisdom, namely that more disputants and lawyers will use mediation if a 
harmonised and expedited enforcement mechanism for MSAs exists. It’s interesting to note, 
however, that despite great hopes to the contrary, this has not been the case in relation to 
domestic mediation. The introduction of domestic legislation to enhance the enforceability of 
MSAs has not resulted in an increase in mediation usage. What makes international mediation 
different in this regard?  
 
Lo: Without a reliable assessment tool, I certainly cannot arbitrarily predict that there will be 
significantly more disputing parties and lawyers willing to rely on mediation merely because of the 
availability of an enforcement mechanism for iMSAs. But perhaps an undeniable fact is that it is 
more difficult to build mutual trust between business counterparts or disputing parties from 
different countries due to the uncertainty of respective legal rules, the unfamiliarity of the 
respective cultural and business practices, and the geographic remoteness of their locations. An 
enforcement mechanism for iMSAs helps business parties to build their trust and increases their 
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willingness of using such a friendlier procedure. I believe that the enforcement mechanism can be 
an important contributing factor for the use of cross-border mediation.  
 
Alexander: What do you see as the main pillars of the draft Convention? 
 
Lo: There is a five-pillar framework in the draft Convention. We thought these pillars are essential 
in building up an effective, friendly and trustworthy mechanism for the businesses and for 
supplementing other dispute settlement mechanisms. 
 
The first pillar is the binding obligations assumed by Contracting States: The draft Convention 
imposes obligations on Contracting States to recognize and enforce iMSAs. Through States 
assuming these obligations, cross-border enforcement of iMSAs will become effective 
and businesses will be more willing to utilize such a system. 
 
The second pillar is the simplicity of the requirements: The draft Convention minimizes the 
requirements for iMSAs to become eligible for recognition and enforcement, with some slight 
differences between iMSAs arising from institutional mediation and iMSAs arising from ad hoc 
mediation, in order to ensure that these iMSAs are genuinely concluded. It also ensures that the 
mechanism is user-friendly.  
 
The third pillar is the assurance of genuineness and quality of iMSAs: The grounds for non-
enforcement of iMSAs are limited to some fundamental problems which would undermine the 
justification for enforcing the iMSAs. This pillar also expects States to develop quality assurance 
mechanisms concerning the provision of mediation services by mediators and organizations 
providing mediation services, as well as to cooperate with each other and international 
organizations in promoting technical assistance. 
 
The fourth pillar is the recognition of parallel regimes: This Draft recognizes parallel and co-
existing regimes for enforcing iMSAs. This is particularly important for States to establish regional 
mechanisms under their economic integrations for the enforcement of iMSAs, to suit their regional 
needs. 
 
The fifth pillar is the universality principle: In order to appropriately ensure broader jurisdictional 
coverage, the draft Convention defines States as including Separate Customs Territories. Through 
such definition, all jurisdictions can be brought under the whole system so as to ensure that there 
will be no problem of doing businesses and of having their disputes being amicably resolved in any 
place around the world. 
 
Alexander: To what extent does the distinction between institutional and ad hoc 
mediation affect the issue of MSA enforcement? 
 
Lo: We recognize that both institutional and ad hoc mediation are constantly used for amicable 
resolution of disputes. In some jurisdictions ad hoc mediation is even more often used. So we include 
both institutional and ad hoc mediation for the purpose of cross-border enforcement.  
 
But we also recognize two differences between them. First, although it is not universally true, 
institutional mediation generally better ensures both procedural and substantive quality. Second, 
there is a concern about fraudulent practice involved in the procedure, because conspiring parties 
are more likely to use ad hoc mediation to resolve fictitious disputes purely to obtain iMSAs for 
illegal purposes. For example, a debtor owes a genuine creditor a huge amount of money and is 
facing civil claims against his property to settle the debt. In order to avoid his property being 
seized or enforced, the debtor may create a huge but fictitious debt by concluding a 
fictitious contract with a fictitious creditor. In this contract, there is a mediation clause permitting 
the parties to resolve their “dispute” through mediation and agreeing to have the MSA being 
enforced. The fictitious creditor may be able to obtain an MSA and, based on it, to swiftly seize 
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and enforce the debtor’s property for the mere purpose of making it difficult for the 
genuine creditor to seize the property or to carry out other civil enforcement measures. This is a 
fraudulent conveyance of property through a conspired MSA, which needs to be prevented. 
 
Since the requirements for the enforcement of iMSAs are quite simple, the distinction between 
iMSAs arising from institutional mediation and iMSAs arising from ad hoc mediation should thus be 
kept minimal for enforcement purposes. Article 4.1(b) of the draft Convention requires the 
mediator of ad hoc mediation to sign the iMSA, so that he/she will commit to act faithfully 
and professionally. Article 4.2(c) also requires proof that the parties are provided with 
opportunities to present their cases or express their expectations from the mediation orally or 
through other means. Mediation rules can serve as such a proof. However, for ad hoc mediation, 
which might not have pre-established mediation rules, a statement in the iMSA to indicate that the 
parties are provided with such opportunities will be needed to show the requisite procedural 
fairness. 
 
Alexander: Can you explain why you chose not to follow the New York Convention on 
Arbitration1 and focus on enforcement of foreign MSAs, but instead focused on international 
MSAs? This would seem to make the scope of the Convention’s application narrower. 
 
Lo: The New York Convention includes "foreign“ and "non-domestic“ arbitral awards for the 
purpose of its application (Article (1)of the New York Convention). There are two points in this 
regard. First, about the terminology, we decided not to use the term "foreign“ because it implies 
that there is some kind of "nationality“ being attached to an MSA. Conceptually, an arbitral 
award can have "nationality“ because it is the binding outcome of an arbiral tribunal functioning 
in accordance with the law. But an MSA is still a private agreement, although assisted by a 
third party (the mediator). A private agreement can have a governing law. But no private 
agreement is given "nationality“. Giving a "nationality“ to an MSA seems to be inconsistent with the 
nature of MSA being a private agreement. So we choose the term "international“ to delink from 
the concept of nationality and to denote that the conclusion and enforcement of the MSA involve 
more than one jursdiction. Second, as to the scope of application, our draft does not show that there 
are the so-called "non-domestic MSAs“ and such MSAs are also subject to enforcement. People 
might call an MSA a "non-domestic MSA“ if it involves foreign elements and if it 
is concluded and being sought to be enforced in the same State. Such an MSA falls within the full 
prescriptive jurisdiction of this particular State and hence it could be considered as domestic MSA 
of this State from regulatory perspective. It is within the States‘ discretion to decide whether to 
enforce such MSAs, just like States have the discretion to extend enforcement to purely 
domestic MSAs. But I tend to believe that States would not have bifurcated legislation to enforce 
iMSAs but not domestic MSAs. 
 
Ma: Combining the internationality requirements of the New York Convention (i.e., MSAs made 
and sought to be enforced in different Contracting States) and the Model Law on Conciliation 
(additional foreign elements) indeed narrows the Convention’s scope of application. Admittedly 
Professor Lo and I have differed on and even changed our views when drafting the Convention’s 
applicability. Yet we both prefer the Convention to be more ambitious than the current regime, 
albeit still cautious. Less is more – a narrower scope is more likely to engender wider acceptance. 
Contracting States may widen the Convention’s scope of application as they see fit. 
 
Alexander: In a similar vein, your draft Convention differs from the New York Convention in 
that it adopts a reciprocity regime rather than an opt-in reciprocity regime, whereby the 
application of the proposed Convention would only be subject to reciprocity when the adopting 
state so declares. This approach was chosen by the New York Convention drafters to expand the 
influence of that Convention and it seems to have been successful. What was the reason for a 
more cautious approach in your Draft Convention?  
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Lo: Under Article I(1) of the New York Convention, it applies to arbitral awards made in "any 
foreign State“, irrespective of whether the State is a Contracting State. But it also adopts what 
you called an opt-in reciprocity, which is the reservation permitted in Article I(3) of the New York 
Conention. Under this provision Contracting States may declare that the Convention will apply only 
to the recognition and enforcement of awards made in the territory of another Contracting State. 
 
Our draft Convention applies to MSAs which are concluded in "the territory of a Contracting 
State“ (Article 1.1 of the draft Convention). MSAs which are not concluded in the territory of a 
Contracting State will not be enforced under the Convention.  There are two reasons for our "treaty 
reciprocity“ regime. First, our general position is not in favor of any reservation with the 
Convention. Mutiple reservations by Contracting States often complicate the application 
and operation of a treaty. Potential users of intenational mediation will have to figure out the 
reservation statuses of different Contracting States so as to know whether their iMSAs will be 
enforced there. This increases transaction costs and may cause confusion for private parties. 
Second, since the enforcement of iMSAs will always be subject to "treaty reciprocity“ under the 
Convention, States will have to seriously consider joining the Convention so as to have the 
iMSAs concluded in their jurisdictions being eligible for enforcement in other jurisdictions. We trust 
that our approach will provide inducement for States to become parties to the Convention. 
 
Alexander: In footnote 6 of the Draft Convention, you note that judicial settlement is 
excluded from the scope of the draft Convention due to concerns about voluntariness. I am 
wondering if you can explain some of these concerns. 
 
Lo: In our original draft, we indicated in footnote 6 that court-annexed mediations are excluded. 
Our consideration was that there could be different kinds of the so-called court-annexed mediation 
and "it might not be clear whether such conciliation is being carried out in the course of a court ... 
proceeding” (as indicated in the "UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation 
with Guide to Enactment and Use 2002“). We later found that the exclusion was too broad. So we 
indicate in footnote 6 of this new version that judicial settlement (i.e., mediation conducted by trial 
judges) and iMSAs arising from it are not within the scope of the Convention. This is merely an 
illustrative example. Any mediation which does not meet the requirement of “two or more parties 
voluntarily request[ing] third person(s) to assist them in their attempt to reach an agreement on 
the settlement of their dispute” would all be excluded according to Article 2(a) of the Convention. 
We consider that voluntariness is the key concept throughout the whole mediation procedure, 
including the stage of entering into mediation (as indicated in Article 2(a) that mediation must be 
voluntarily requested by the disputing parties), the stage of concluding an MSA (as per Article 2(c), 
iMSA is an agreement between the parties) and the stage of agreeing to the enforcement of MSA 
(as indicated in Article 4.1(d) that parties’ consent to the enforceability must be given). 
Voluntariness is also emphasized in the last paragraph of the preamble of the draft Convention that 
“the values of mediation in its overall voluntary nature, party autonomy and self-determination … 
and consensuality of outcome” must be preserved. 
 
Alexander: So party autonomy extends to the choice to enter the mediation process. This 
would seem to exclude MSAs which result from: 
 Mandatory mediation schemes; 
 Incentive schemes such as the pre-action protocol in England and Practice Direction 31 
in Hong Kong, which provide for the possibility of costs sanctions against a party who 
unreasonsably refuses to engage in mediation. 
 
Is that right? 
 
Lo: It is right. In our view, parties‘ voluntariness of entering into a meditation proceeding is a very 
important feature of the Draft Convention. It is to avoid possible distortion or States’ unnecessary 
intervention in the mediation proceeding. Under the draft Convention, it would not meet the 
requirement of “two or more parties voluntarily request[ing] third person(s) to assist them in their 
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attempt to reach an agreement on the settlement of their dispute” when a mediation is 
mandatorily required (without parties’ agreement to enter into mediation) under a domestic law 
or a mediation rule, or when entering into mediation (without parties’ agreement to enter into 
mediation) is necessary to obtain an advantage or to avoid a disadvantage. 
 
 
Alexander: I’m interested in where you draw the line on party autonomy. What about the 
following situation: one of the parties to a cross-border mediation clause in 
a commercial contract refuses to go to mediation and institgates court proceedings instead. The 
other party obtains a court order to stay litigation proceedings pending compliance with the 
mediation clause. Mediation then takes place and results in an iMSA. Would you imagine that 
this iMSA could fall within your draft Convention? 
 
Lo: An iMSA arising from the situation you mentioned (i.e., the parties complying with their 
mediation clause because of a court order to stay litigation proceedings) should fall within the 
scope of the draft Convention. When deciding whether “two or more parties voluntarily request 
third person(s) to assist them“ as provided by the draft Convention, the focus should be on whether 
there is a mediation agreement or clause voluntarily entered into by the parties to have 
third person(s) assisting them to reach an iMSA. When there is a valid agreement to mediate, the 
resulting iMSA should fall within  the draft Convention. 
 
Ma: Indeed, party autonomy should focus on the parties‘ initial voluntary agreement to mediate 
regardless of their subsequent change of mind. It is noteworthy that during the early stages of our 
MSA Project we considered whether the draft Convention should also deal with the enforcement of 
mediation agreements/clauses in conjunction with the enforcement of mediated settlement 
agreements (similar to the enforcement of both arbitration agreements and arbitral awards under 
the New York Convention).  
 
Alexander: The issue of party autonomy is also tied in with process integrity. You have 
adopted a wide definition of mediation consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation. With such a definition we are talking about a range of 
dispute resolution processes, where party autonomy may be influenced in different ways 
throughout various processes: for example, mediation, conciliation, neutral evaluation and non-
binding arbitration fall within your definition of mediation. Yet these processes have different 
functional characteristics. Recognising this point, courts have been known to refuse enforcement 
of so-called mediation clauses where mediation has been defined to encompass different dispute 
resolution processes.2 It would seem that treating outcomes of these processes in the same way 
in terms of enforcement entails certain risks to the integrity of the mediation process, in 
particular its understanding of party autonomy. By way of example, advisory processes which 
include private sessions with each party, do not permit parties to respond to arguments made 
against them by the other side in private session. While the third party does not make a binding 
decision, he or she makes a recommendation that is likely to be highly influential on the parties. 
Further there is no guarantee that the “mediator“ has the competence to advise in the area of the 
recommendations. Can you comment on these reflections? 
 
Lo: Depending upon different models and types of mediation, a mediator might interfere more 
actively in the process so as to reconcile the dispute, or less actively, only to persuade the parties to 
settle their dispute, or very minimally, merely to provide an opportunity to the disputing parties to 
faciltate their discussions. The draft Convention does not say much about the roles and functions of 
a mediator. The bottom line is that the mediator should not have "any authority to impose upon the 
parties a solution to the dispute“ (Article 2(b) of the draft Convention). As long as an iMSA is 
entered into by the disputing parties based on their free will, it is qualified as an enforceable iMSA 
(i.e., "agreement between the parties arising out of mediation to resolve their dispute“ as defined in 
Article 2(c)) for the purpose of the draft Convention.  
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Two other procedural guarantees are in Articles 4.2(b) and (c), which require the mediator(s) to be 
free from conflict of interest and the parties to be provided with opportunities to present their cases 
or express their expectations from the mediation orally or through other means. The process 
integrity is preserved so long as the parties have full control to decide whether they 
intend to conclude an iMSA and whether they are assisted by the mediator in a neutral way. 
 
In your example, an advisory process which includes private sessions with each party, but does not 
permit parties to respond to arguments made against them by the other side in private sessions will 
still meet the procedural requirement to the extent that the parties are provided with opportunities 
to present their cases or express their expectations from the mediation orally or through other 
means. Even if a mediator has the power to make a recommendation, which could be very 
persuasive or influential from professional or technical perspectives, then such power of making a 
recommendation does not prevent parties from entering into an iMSA based on their free will. It is 
still an enforceable iMSA. Certainly, it would require a certain degree of competence to make a 
proper recommendation. But it is like arbitration, where competence is desirable, but a guarantee 
of absolute competence in the field of dispute resolution is not always possible. 
 
Alexander: Your answer about “voluntariness“ leans heavily on party autonomy and self-
determination, which are basically Western values. In contrast, Eastern countries tend to favor a 
more collectivist or harmony-maintaining set of goals. In light of this, do you think that there is 
any potential for acceptance of iMSAs and their enforcement between parties who are both from 
a more collectivist or harmony-maintaining culture (as opposed to autonomy-
favouring cultures)? 
 
Lo: This is another excellent reason to look at the draft Convention from cultural perspectives. It is 
true that collectivism (in terms of prioritizing group goals over personal goals 
and emphazising cohesion within groups) still plays certain roles in social and political contexts in 
many Eastern countries. It is also important in “intra-company“ practices under which a company 
is the group whose goal should be prioritized over individual employees‘ goals. But when it comes 
to the external relations of a company, it is of minimal importance. Nowadays, most businesses, 
especially big companies, have to engage in effective competition with domestic and foreign 
suppliers. They are as profit-oriented as Western companies. Their business goals play the key role 
in their behaviours. Their decisions on the acceptance of iMSAs and their enforcement would surely 
be based on the assessment of advantages and disadvantages to their businesses.  
 
On the other hand, I would say that harmony-maintaining culture is still a positive element 
affecting the attitude of Eastern people toward dispute resolution. People there tend to be less 
litigious, partly because of the tradition of maintaining harmony in the society. Because of the 
enphasis of harmonious social relations, it was widely practiced in some Eastern societies that 
senior and respected individuals were expected to come forward to coordinate differences so as to 
maintain a harmonious relationship between disputants. This traditional practice is actually in line 
with the modern concept of mediation, which is considered as the most friendly dispute settlement 
method.  
 
From these perspectives, there should not be any cultural difficulty for Eastern people to accept 
iMSAs and their enforcement. 
 
Alexander: Article 4.2 of the draft Convention states that the iMSA shall include: 
“(b) Proof that the mediator(s) and any organization providing mediation services are free 
from conflict of interest in the subject matter of the mediation.” While I appreciate that this 
provision seeks to address process quality issues, I am wondering whether it might be more 
useful for the provision to refer to compliance with institutional rules or codes of conduct 
in cases of institutional mediation, at least. While conflict of interest is a central issue, I can think 
of situations where parties may recognise that a certain mediator has a real conflict of interest 
and nevertheless wish that person to proceed as the mediator. Isn’t this party autonomy in 
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action? Moreover, there are other mediation values and ethical principles, in addition to 
disclosure of conflicts of interest, that would usually be included in a code or similar instrument. 
 
Lo: Compliance with a comprehensive code of conduct or ethical principles for mediators would be 
most desirable for the purpose of  ensuring the integrity and quality of the mediated results. 
However, the current situation is that there is no universally accepted code of conduct. Although 
there are institutional codes of conduct for mediators, their standards vary widely. 
Some codes could be very strict, while some others could be below minimal and  reasonable 
expectations; for instance, not requiring individuals with a conflict of interest to abstain 
from conducting mediation. The draft Convention can only set forth a minimum requirement that 
the mediator should not have any conflict of interest in the subject matter.  
 
However, we are very mindful of codes of conduct and of the mechanisms to ensure the quality of 
mediation. We therefore include Article 9 to require Contracting States to encourage the 
development of, and adherence to, voluntary codes of conduct by mediators and organizations 
providing mediation services, as well as other effective quality control mechanisms concerning the 
provision of mediation services, and to require them to cooperate with each other and with 
mediation organizations to promote bilateral or regional technical assistance, training 
opportunities for mediators and exchange of information. We expect that such a "soft 
approach“ will still have a positive effect on the progressive but overall improvement of the quality 
of mediation proceedings and the iMSAs. 
 
Concerning the scenario where the disputing parties expressly wish a person with a conflict of 
interest to serve as their mediator, I tend to believe that this is not a desirable situation. 
Such conflict of interest could eventually become the source of dispute in future performance or 
implementation of the iMSAs or an excuse to renege on a promise. The simplest approach is to 
avoid persons with a conflict of interest from becoming a mediator of a dispute.  
 
Alexander: Your view on conflicts of interest is likely to clash with a number of institutional 
rules on mediation. For example, Article 5.3 of the International Chamber of Commerce’s ICC 
Mediation Rules3 seems to adopt the view that mediators may continue  to be impartial 
provided conflicts of interest have been disclosed and there are no objections from the parties. 
Do you think this will make your draft Convention less attractive to institutional users? 
 
Lo: If the circumstance calling into question the mediator’s independence in the eyes of the parties 
mentioned in Article 5.3 of the ICC Mediation Rules is about the mediator’s previous view, it is not 
the kind of conflict of interest that  our draft Convention refers to. However, if the circumstance is 
of such nature that the mediator’s direct or indirect interest is involved, it should not be 
appropriate for him/her to conduct mediation. This is a legislative policy and Contracting States 
will have to decide whether to adopt our proposal. Our intention is to avoid possible regret of a 
party in the performance stage, either because of the feeling that the outcome has not been fair to 
it due to the mediator‘s interest involved, or just because it needs to find an excuse to “justify“ its 
non-performance.  If Contracting States are to accept our proposal, then those institutional rules 
which are in conflict with the Convention will have to be adjusted. 
 
Alexander: Article 5.2 of the draft Convention states: “Each Contracting State shall decide the 
proper methods of enforcing the iMSA under its legal system.” Is this similar to Article 6 of the 
EU Directive on Mediation? Can you explain how your provisions differ (or not) from the EU 
Directive? 
 
Lo: EU Directive on Mediation Art 6.2 requires making the content of an MSA enforceable by 
a court or other competent authority in a judgment or decision or in an authentic instrument in 
accordance with the law of the enforcing State. Article 5.1 of the draft Convention ("An iMSA 
meeting the requirements prescribed in Article 4 shall become enforceable by a court or 
other competent authority in a judgment, decision, or authentic instrument in accordance with the 
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law of the Enforcing State“) is similar to the provision of the EU Directive on Mediation. However, 
we also understand the possible differences in different legal systems concerning the methods of 
enforcing an MSA. Article 5.2 of the draft Convention recognizes such differences and confirms that 
Contracting States do not have to change their legal systems for the purpose of discharging their 
obligations under the draft Convention. They can meet their obligations as long as an iMSA is made 
enforceable in accordance with their existing systems. 
 
Ma: The debate on whether and how to harmonise the diverse and inconsistent methods for 
enforcing MSAs persists. Meanwhile, Article 5.1 of the draft Convention simply preserves 
the currently common methods of enforcement (like the EU Directive on Mediation) while 
Article 5.2 expressly permits  other methods of enforcement (unlike the EU Directive on Mediation). 
The draft Convention also differs from the EU Directive on Mediation by prescribing more 
requirements for enforcing iMSAs (Article 4) in addition to imposing an obligation on Contracting 
States to enforce iMSAs (Article 3). 
 
Alexander: You talked about a universality principle previously, namely broader 
jurisdictional coverage of the Separate Customs Territories. Do you think such a term will be 
interpreted to cover the increasing number of special economic zones around the world? These 
zones, which include Shanghai, Shenzhen, Dubai, Batam and Mumbai have their own legislation, 
and are being established around the globe to support local trading and foreign investment. 
 
Lo: The term "Separate Customs Territory“ is used in the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements. The requirement is that the territory must possess full autonomy in the conduct of 
external commercial relations and other matters under the WTO. We use the term to decide the 
qualification for participation in the Convention for three reasons. First, this clause 
would avoid possible political difficulty for several jurisdictions (such as Taiwan) to join the 
Convention. Second, the flexibility would also enable jurisictions like Hong Kong and Macau to join 
the Convention based on their governments‘ decisions. Third, such provision would also enable the 
European Union to join the Convention as a contracting party, to enjoy rights and assume 
obligations by itself. The ultimate purpuse is to widen the Convention’s application.  
 
Regarding the special economic zones you mentioned, although such zones are authorized by 
States to enact separate rules for business activities there, they probably do not have "full 
autonomy“ in the conduct of their external commercial relations. So the answer to your question is 
no, the term  “Separate Customs Territories“ would not be interpreted to cover such zones currently 
existing in some countries. But I would not preclude the possibility of a State giving full autonomy  
of external commercial relations to its special economic zones  so as to make them eligible for 
participation in the Convention. 
 
Alexander: Imagine it’s the year 2030. Do you see your draft Convention or a similar multi-
lateral convention as offering a single primary enforcement system for iMSAs? What do you say 
to the notion that a maintaining a choice of enforcement mechanisms for iMSAs is more suited to 
the flexible nature of mediation than having a single a primary enforcement mechanism or 
system? For example, existing mechanisms that might have relevance to iMSAs include: 
• Article 6 of the EU Directive on Mediation; 
• Article 58 of the Brussels I Regulation; 
• Article 24 or 25 of the Regulation No 805/2004; 
• Hague Convention on Choice of Court; 
• Institutionalised arb-med-arb procedures such as that offered by the Singapore 
International Mediation Centre. 
 
Lo: Although court-referred MSAs could be regulated by  Article 58 of the Brussels I Regulation, 
Article 24 or 25 of Regulation No 805/2004 and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements, such MSAs do not meet the requirement of two or more parties voluntarily requesting 
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a third person(s) to assist them in their attempt to reach an MSA. So they are not included in our 
draft Convention.   
 
With respect to the EU Directive on Mediation, Article 6 is about the choice of enforcement 
mechanisms for iMSAs when it is compared with the draft Convention. The draft Convention is 
designed to become a multilateral instrument which allows its Contracting States to enter into 
separate multilateral, regional or bilateral instruments concerning the enforcement of iMSAs 
(Article 7.1). It is in line with the spirit of the draft Convention if the separate instruments are to 
enhance the enforcement of iMSAs. Article 6 of the EU Directive on Mediation is an example 
showing the possibility of having multilevel legal schemes of enforcing iMSAs. To the extent that the 
minimum requirement of enforcing iMSAs is maintained, multilevel legal systems to mutually 
enhance and support the enforcement of iMSAs will not undermine the effectiveness and integrity 
of the draft Convention. But I would say that if we can make the kind of convention we proposed as 
useful as possible, the need for creating separate multilateral, regional or bilateral 
instruments could become quite minimal.  
 
The draft Convention does not prevent disputing parties from utilizing the dispute settlement 
schemes they prefer, such as arb-med-arb procedures. The institutionalised arb-med-
arb procedures provide an option for parties to structure their contractual relations. We cannot 
preclude parties from using the mixture of different modes of dispute settlement mechanisms (such 
as arb-med-arb procedures) to achieve their business objectives. But I would predict that if there is 
a kind of convention similar to what we propose here, the need of relying on arb-med-
arb procedures for the purpose of securing future enforcement of the mediated results could be 
vastly reduced.  
 
Our hope is that the cross-border enforcement mechanism proposed in the draft Convention can be 
the primary one for iMSAs in the future. 
 
                                                 
1 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). 
2 See, e.g.,  Morrow v Chinadotcom Ltd [2001] NSWSC 209, where a clause referring parties to “dispute 
resolution” was struck out for lack of certainty.  
3 ICC Mediation Rule 5.3 provides: “Before appointment or confirmation, a prospective Mediator shall sign 
a statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality and independence. The prospective Mediator shall 
disclose in writing to the Centre any facts or circumstances which might be of such a nature as to call into 
question the Mediator’s independence in the eyes of the parties, as well as any circumstances that could 
give rise to reasonable doubts as to the Mediator’s impartiality. The Centre shall provide such information 
to the parties in writing and shall fix a time limit for any comments from them.” 
